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A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH
TO THE ANALYSIS AND DESIGN OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
The problems of designing and evaluating internal control systems
have concerned accountants and auditors for many years. Until recently
little attention has been paid to the possibility of applying mathematical
modelling techniques to these problems. Perhaps the closest thing to an
analytical technique in this field is the internal control questionnaire
in wide use among auditors. However, the nominal measures generated by
such questionnaires are of dubious value for purposes of developing com-
prehensive models of internal control systems. Evidence of this statement
is provided by the failure of one such approach to germinate following its
exposure over a decade ago.
Recent accounting literature has examined mathematically the subject
2
of control in accounting. However, these presentations have centered
around the concept of feedback. WTiile this is certainly a vital management
control concept, its usefulness in connection with traditional analysis of
internal control is yet to be demonstrated.
Gene Brown, "Objective Internal Control Evaluation," The Journal
of Accountancy , November, 1962, pp. 50-56.
2
See for example Yuji Ijiri and Gerald L. Thompson, "Applications
of Mathematical Control Theory to Accounting and Budgeting (The Continu-
ous Wheat Trading Model)," The Accounting Review , April 1970, pp. 246-258;
Nicholas J. Gonedes, "Optimal Timing of Control Messages for a Two-State
Markov Process," Journal of Accounting Research
,
Autumn 1971, pp. 236-252;
and Joel S. Demski, Information Analysis (Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley
Publishing Company, Inc., 1972), Chapter Six.
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The purposes of this paper are (1) to describe a means o£ represent-
ing internal control in mathematical terms > (2) to demonstrate how such
mathematical representations may be useful to controllers and auditors in
designing and evaluating internal control .-systems j and (3) to discuss the
implications of this approach for future research in accounting and audit-
ing.
The type of internal controls cf concern here are those intended to
prevent inaccuracies in data proces'^^ -ng or embezzlement. Feedback control
systems are not primarily designed to prevent errors or deviations, but to
detect and report on their existence in ordeir that some control adjustment
may be made. Therefore, the modelling techniques which adopt the concept
of feedback are not discussed in this paper.
To clarify the presentation, an example of an accounting process ii
used throughout the paper. The exampje involves the posting of cash re-
ceipts to customer accounts within an industrial organization. Possible
errors in such a system include H.) a discrepancy between the amount of
cash actually received aiid the iiiiount went.ually j'osted to the accounts
receivable control accou.a, (2) ijcstir.\^ of a receipt to the wrong account,
(3) overpayment or underpayTiiert by he customer, and (4) embezzlement of
cash receipts. PosPiJle controi rsoasures include (.1.) clerical reviev; and
rticonciliation of indnvtdu;.il reiaittcncrs to eacii customer account prior
to posting by the accounts receivable clerk, (2) separrtion of the func-
tion of accounts receivable o ".om the function of cashi' check-
ing of control totals by the accourts r<>ceivable clerk subsequent to
posting of a batch of receipts, (4) comparison of data provided by the

accounts receivable clerk with that provided by the cashier prior to post-
ing to the general ledger by the general ledger clerk, and (5) preparation
of a hank reconciliation periodically by an independent authority. Each
of these examples of errors and control techniques is used at some point
within the paper to illustrate the application of the internal control
model.
A distinction important to the model is that between an internal con-
trol technique and an internal control system. An internal control technique
is basically a single procedure, whereas an internal control system may
consist of several internal control techniques. A given internal control
technique may be designed to prevent one error only, or possibly two or
more errors. Within an internal control system, some of the techniques
used may be intended to prevent one error, while others may be intended
to prevent a number of different errors. Conversely, any given error may
be the focus of one control technique or of two or more control techniques.
Since the approach to modelling an internal control system builds upon
models of internal control techniques, this paper first describes the
latter and then proceeds to the former.
Internal Control Techniques
As mentioned, a single internal control technique may be intended to
prevent one error alone or multiple errors. Both of these situations are
considered in this section.
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Single Control "Single Error Case
A general niociel of tnis situation is diagramed in Exhibit 1. The
situation consists of a process subject to control, a control procedure
which monitors the process, and an error-correction procedure. The use
of a control t t ^ ' ~ ash receipts processing provides a good example.
Assume that oii k prepares a control totao. of the dollar amount re-
ceived for all remittances ea*. , id then, provides the remittance
advices to a second clerk, who then posts each remittance to the corres-
ponding account. At the completion of posting, the second clerk obtains
a total of the updated balances of p.ll accounts. This updated total is
subtracted from the control account total prior to posting, and the result
is compared to the original control total. If there is no discrepancy, the
process is considered complete. If a discrepancy exists, an error correc-
tion procedure is initiated for the purpose of detecting and correcting
the specific error or errors underlying the dlscrepcincy.
Process Contr;
; let ion
ox Process
_-|. Error
\ Correction
Exhibit 1
The mathematical technique used to aodel this situation is a simple
stochastic model drav.T. from the field of reliability engineering.
For a basic reference on this rubject, see David K. Lloyd and Myron
Lipow, Reliability: Management, Methods, and Mathematics (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962).

Basically, this model provides a means of computing the reliability of a
process, which is the probability that the process will be completed with
no errors. Reliability in this simple case is a function of the following
parameters: (1) the probability, p, that the process is correctly executed
prior to administering the control technique, (2) the probability, PCe)>
that the control step will detect and signal an error given that one exists,
(3) the probability, P(s), that the control step will not signal an error
given that none exists, (4) the probability, P(c), that the correction
step will correct an error given that one exists and has been signaled,
and (5) the probability, P(d), that failure of the control will be detec-
ted and no correction made given that the control signals an error when
none exists.
Reliability, indicated by R, in this case is equal to the sum of
(l)pP(s), the probability that the process is executed correctly and the
control step does not signal an error, C2) pCl-P(s))P(d) , the probability
that the process is executed correctly, the control step signals an error,
and the failure of the control is detected and no attempt at correction is
made, and (3) (l-p)P(e)P(c) , the probability that an error in the proces*-
is made, but that the control step signals the error and the proper cor-
rection is made. Reliability is therefore expressed as:
R = pPCs) + p(l-P(s))PCd) + (l-p)P(e)P(c)
By a similar process of enumeration of failure possibilities, it can be
shown that the probability of a failure to correctly complete the process is
1-R = (l-p)(l-P(e)) -f Cl-p)Pte)Cl-P(c)) + p(l-P(s))Cl-P(d))

The contribution of the control step to this process is to increase
4
the probability that the process will be completed vvith no error by R-p.
To determine whether the control step .s worthwhile, however, it is neces-
sary to examine costs. The cost parameters which are necessary to the
analysis are (1) Cc, the cost of perfoxiiing the control procedure each
time the process is executed, (2) Cs, the average cost of searching for
an error and detecting whether one exists once the control technique has
signalled that one exists, and then making whatever corrections are neces-
sary, and (3) Ce, the average cost of an uncorrected error. Given these
parameters, it is obvious that the expected total cost of errors in the
process if the control step is not performed is
Ct = (i-p)Ce
However, if the control step is performed, the expected total cost is equ.ii
to the sum of the expected costs of (i) performance of the control step, Cc
(2) uncorrected errors, (l-R)Ce, and (3) search, detection and correction,
[p(l-P(s}) + (l-p)P(s) ]Cs. Thin total is therefore expressed as
Ct = Cc + (l-R)Ce - [p(l-P(sr, < (I-p)P(e)]Cs
The cost differential Ct -• Ct bhould provide a controller with a useful
basis for the choice of whether to use a particular control procedure in
a particular situation.
To illustrate these concepts numerically, consider the following set
of hypothetical parameter values for the cash receipts processing example:
4
Alternatively, the control step could actually decrease the relia-
bility of the process by p-R if p > R.

p = .8 PCd) =
PCe) = .95 Cc = 2
PCs) = .9 Cs = 3
PCc) = .98 Ce = 20
.99
Table 1 summarizes the computations outlined above. These figures indicate thftt?
the use of a batch control total in this example would increase reliability of
posting from 80% to over 98% and would reduce average total cost by .898 units
per day.
Elements summed to obtain R Elements summed to obtain Cl-R)
pPCs) = C.8)C.9) = .7200 Cl-p)Cl-PCe)) = C.2)C.05) = .0100
pCl-PCs))PCd) = C.8)C.1)(.99) = .0792 Cl-p)PCe)Cl-P(c)) == C.2)C.95)C.02) == .0038
Cl-p)PCe)PCc) = C.2)C.95)C.98) = .1862
R = .9854
PCl-PCs))Cl-P(d)) =
Cl-R)
= C.8)C.1)(.01) == .0008
.0146
R - p = .9854 - .8 = .1854
Ct = Cl-p)Ce = C.2)C20) = 4
Ct = Cc + Cl-R)Ce + IpCl-PCs)) + Cl-p)P(e)]Cs
= 2 + C-0146)20 + C.27)C3)
= 3.102
Table 1
The reliability model described above illustrates the basic framework of
the approach presented in this paper. Within this framework are identified all
of the basic parameters which are relevant to the analytical evaluation of inter-
nal control. In the next section, this model is extended to illustrate its
application in a situation where one control technique may provide control over
two or more possible errors.
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Single Control-Multiple Error Case
As an example of this situation, consider once again the process of
posting cash receipts to an accounts receivable ledger. One control tech-
nique which a posting clerk might use is to reconcile the receipt to the
charges in the ledger account - that is, to figure out which specific
charges the payment is intended. In an industrial setting, most customers
will include with payment a remittance advice which provides the data neces-
sary to perform this reconciliation. There are at least two distinctly
different types of errors which this procedure should detect: (1) payment
of an incorrect amount by the customer, and (2) an attempt to post the
transaction to the wrong account. A diagram of this one control-two error
case appears in Exhibit II.
Process r* ~._*. 1
:*
Completion
Contrui of Process
V
>
^ / \
f
I
Error #1
Correction
1 1
Error #2
Correction
i
Exhibit II
The development below covers the more general case of n types of
errors which may be detected and signalled by a control technique. It is
assumed that the error correction procedure is different for each type of
error. It is also assumed that the values of all probability parameters
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relating to the ith error type are independent of whether any other type
of error is present. For example, the probability of detecting and cor-
recting an attempt to post to the wrong account is independent of whether
the customer paid the wrong amount. This assumption results in consider-
able simplification of the analysis.
In a situation of this class, the five basic probability parameters
may be expressed as p., P(e.)j PCs.)j PCcO and P(d.), where the subscript
identifies the particular type of error. Given these parameters, the
reliability of the system with respect to each type of error may then be
expressed
R. = P^PCs^) + p.(l-P(.s^3PCd^) + (l-p-)P(epP(c^)
where R. represents the probability of completing the process with the ith
error not present. The overall reliability, R, or probability of complet-
ing the process with no errors of any kind, is then expressed as
R = CRi)(R2)---.(Rn)
On the other hand, if no control technique is applied, the probability of
completing the process with no errors of any kind is
P = (Pl)(P2) CPr,)
In this case the difference R-p represents the contribution of the control
technique to the overall reliability of the system.
The analysis of costs in this situation is more interesting because
Cc, the cost of performing the control technique, is a joint cost, whereas
the other cost parameters, Cs and Ce, are unique to each type of error.
Therefore, the expected total cost of errors in the process if the control
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step is not performed is
n
Ct = I (1-p.) Ce.
} = 1 1
where Ce. represents the average cost of an undetected error of type i.
Alternatively, expected total cost if the contxol is performed becomes
Ct = Cc + .? (l-R.)Ce. +
.:,[p. Cl-P(s.)) + (l-p.)P(e.)]Cs.
where Cc is the cost of performing the error procedure, and Cs. is the cost
of searching for the ith type of error once its existence has been signalled,
and of correcting it.
To illustrate these concepts numerically, consider the two-error case
where the following set of hypothetical parameter values have been esti-
mated :
Pi = .8 P2 = .9
P(ei) = .95 ?Ce2) = .96
P(si) = .9 P(S2) = .95
P(c,) = .98 P(C2J = .99
PCdi) = .99 P(d2) = 1.0
Cc = 1 CS2 = 2
Csi - 3 Ceo = 8
Cei = 10
Table 2 summarizes the computations for the formulae presented above. In
this example, use of the control technique increases overall reliability
by about 26% and reduces expected total costs by .52232 units. In the
example involving reconciliation of individual remittances to subsidiary
ledger accounts, this figure would represent the expected average cost
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reduction per remittance. Multiplication by average daily volume would
then be necessary in order to convert to a more meaningful daily cost
figure.
R = p^PCs.) + p.(l-PCi^:)Prd ) + (1-p,) P(e.)P(c.)
R = (.8)(.9) + C.83C.i)(.S9J + (.2)C.95)(.98) = .9854
R^ = (.9)(.95) + (.9)(.05)(1.0) + (.1) (.96) (.99) = .99504
R = (R^)(R2) = (.9854) (.99504) = .9805 (approx.)
p = (Pi)(P2) = (-8) (.9) = .72
R-p = .9805 - .72 = .2605
n
Ct = .E^ (1-pp Ce.
= (.2) (10) + (.1)(8)
= 2.8
Ct = Cc -t 2 (l-R.)Ce. : L [p.(l-P(s.)} + (l-p.)P(e. ) ]Cs.
= 1 + (.0146) (10) + [(.8)(.l) -^ (.2) (.95)] (3) + (.00496) (8)
+ [(.9) (.OS) -<• C.-l)(.96)](2)
= 1 + .146 + .81 + .03968 + .282
= 2.27768
Table 2
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Internal Control Systems
Internal control systems compris one or more internal control tech-
niques directed at one or more errors within a single process or set of
related processes. Systems ijicluding only one technique are covered in
the previous section. This section covers systems of two or more tech-
niques. The first part within the section deals with multiple techniques
directed at controlling a single error while the second part deals with
systems of multiple controls directed at multiple errors.
Multiple Control -Single Error Case
The simplest form of this type of situation would be a system having
two controls, as diagramed in Exhibit III. To provide a realistic example,
consider again the use of a batch total to prevent posting of an inaccurate
total of cash receipts to the accounts receivable control account. Control
#1 would consist of the checking of the batch total by the accounts receiv-
able clerk immediately upon completion of the posting process. A second
control would consist of a check by the general ledger clerk of the summary
data provided by the accounts receivable clerk against a copy of the bank
deposit slip provided by the cashier. This second control would at times
detect errors that were not caught by the first control step.
Consider nov. the effect of multiple control steps on the basic para-
meters of the control model. There should normally be no effect upon p.,
the probability that the initial process is correctly executed. However,
the probabilities pertaining to the control technique and to the error
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correction procedure should be unique for each control technique. These
will be expressed as P(e..), P(s..)> f(c..) and P(d..), where the value
of j identifies the particular control technique. The development below
covers the general case in which r co itrol techniques ai'e being used.
Control #1 Control #2
Completion
of Process
1
Error
Correction |
Exhibit III
Among the cost parameters, the cost of performing the control technique
IS obviously unique to each control technique, and will be expressed as Cc.
However, the other cost parameters, Csj^ and Cei, should be invariant with
respect to the control technique used.
To understand the expression of verall reliability in situations
involving multiple control techniques, note that the probaoility that no
error is present prior to the second and all subsequent control steps is
equal to the reliability of the system up to and including the previous
control step. This intermediate reliability is denoted by R
.
, which, to
be precise, represents the probability that no errors of type i are present
subsequent to the performance of the jth control step, and of its corres-
ponding error correction procedure where necessary.
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Having made this clear, the formula for overall system reliability
where r control techniques are used to control a single type of error
may now be presented. Assume that the error type is identified by i = 1.
The expression for R is then as foliov/s:
As implied by this formula, it is necessary to derive a value for all R^
where 0<j<r before R can be computed. The formula for R:^ has the same
form:
rJ =
RJ"^ Pfs^.) + F|"^Cl-P(s..))PCdj.) + Cl-Rj-^)P(e^.)P(c^.)
Of course, R"! = p, v/here j = 1. Given a particular sequence of perform-
ance of control techniques, it is possible to compute the marginal contri-
i '-1bution to system reliability of the jth control technique as R-: - R-'
With respect to system cost, the expected total cost if no control
technique is used is expressed in exactly the same manner as in the single
control case, i.e.
Ct - (1-pp Ce^
However, if r control techniques are used, the expected average total cost
is expressed
• r r
Ct = .E Cc. + (l-R)Ce, + Z
3=1 J 1 j=i
r|'^1-P(s^.))+ (l-R]"^)PCe^.)lCSj
For decision purposes, Ct should be computed for all possible values of r
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in order that the decision-raaker may decide whether to use all available
control techniques or some subset thereof.
Once again these concepts should be clarified by a numerical example.
Consider the two-control case v/liera the follovjing set of hypothetical
parameter values have been estijnated:
Pi = .s PCe^^J -~ .9 P(e^2^ = .95
Cc^ = 2 P(s,p = .9 P(Sj2) = -96
CC2= 3 P(c,p = .95 P(c^2) = .98
Ce^ = 20 P(d,l) = .99 P(d,2) -- 1-0
Cs^ = 4
The various computations applying the formulae presented above are summar-
ized in Table 3. It is interesting to note from the example that the first
control step performed adds significantly more to reliability than the
second. This is likely to be true in most actual situations. The cost
figures in this example also reflect this characteristic, since the total
expected avercge cost using no contro' i is less than that using two con-
trols, but greater than that using only one control.
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= r\~^ P(s^.) + r|'^ (l-P(Sj.))P(d^.) + (l-RJ-^^PCe^.) PCc^.)
= (.8)(.9) + (.8)(.1)(.99) + C.2)C.9)(.95) = .97 (approx.)
R R^ = (.97)(.96) + (.97)(.04)(1.0) + ( .03) ( .95) (.98) = .99793
- Pi ,97 - .8 .17
.99793 - .97 = .02793
Ct = (l-Pi)Ce^ = (.2)C20) = 4
I r r
Ct = Z Cc. + (1-R) Ce, + E
j=l J 1 j=l
RJ-^ (1-P(s,,)) + (l-R:! ^) P(e,J
Ij V- Cs,
2 + 3 + (.00207)(20) + ['(..8)(.l) + (.2)(.9)]4 + [C.97)(.04) + (.03)(.95)|4
6.3505
If only the first control is used:
Ct = 2 + (.03)(20) + [(.8)(.l) + (.2)(.9)] 4
= 3.64
Table 3
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Multiple Control-Multiple Error Case
This is the general case, and is characteristic of most actual situa-
tions where internal controls are used. As an example within the framework
of cash receipts processing, consider control techniques which would tend
to prevent both (1) posting of an inaccurate total of cash received, and
(2) embezzlement of cash receipts. Two possible control techniques would
be (1) separation of the functions of the cashier and accounts receivable
clerk, and (2) periodic preparation of a bank reconciliation by a person
not connected with cash receipts processing. Both of these controls should
contribute to the prevention of both of the objectionable conditions cited.
A third control, the use of a batch total check, would tend to prevent
inaccurate postings, but might contribute little or nothing to the preven-
tion of embezzlement, since the embezzler could always manipulate the batch
total.
This example points up the fact that there are many cases where a
particular control is not intended to prevent a particular type of error.
In these cases, P(e..) = and therefore R. = R.
The simplest example of a situation in this general class is one
involving two control techniques and two errors. Exhibit IV illustrates
such a situation in which both controls are directed at both types of
errors
.

Process
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Control #1
Error #1
I Correction
Error #2
* Correction
Control #2
"A TfT
Error #1
Correction
^ Error #2
Correction
Completion
of Process
Exhibit IV
The mathematical expression of reliability in the multiple control-
multiple error case is a straightforward extension of the two prior cases.
The formula for reliability with respect to the ith error at the completion
of the jth control step is as follows:
R^ = R^'-^ PCs..) + R^"-^(1-P(s. .))P(d. + (l-R^"-^)P(e..)PCc..)
As before, R. = p. where j = 1. Where r control techniques are used,
R. represents system reliability with respect to the ith error type.
Overall system reliability, or the probability that no errors of any kind
are present subsequent to the last control step, is expressed
R (R^) (R2) («;>
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Expected total cost if no controls are present is expressed in pre-
cisely the same manner as in the singl:. control-multiple error case, i.e.
n
Ct = I (l-p.)Ce.
i=l i 1
The formula for expected average total cost where r control techniques
are used and n types of errors may be present is as follows:
f r n _ n r
Ct = E Cc. + E (l-R.)Ce. + E E
j=l J i=l i' 1 i=l j=l
R^"^(l-P(s
.)) + (l-R^"^)PCe
1- T J J-
. olcs.
As mentioned previously, Ct should be computed for all possible subsets of
the r available control techniques. In this way, the decision-maker can
determine whether it is most economical to use all r control techniques,
some subset thereof, or no controls at all.
A numerical example should again prove useful in clarifying the var-
ious concepts outlined above. Consider the following set of hypothetical
parameter values for a two control -two error case:
Pi
P2
Cc^
^^1
Ce_
Cs
Cs.
=
.5
=
.8
= 1
= 2
= 20
= 10
= 3
= 2
PCe
P(s
P(c
P(d
P(e
P(s
P(c
PCd
11
11
11
11
21
21
21
21
=
.8
=
.9
=
.9
=
.96
=
.95
=
.96
=
.98
=
.98
P(e
PCs
PCc
P(d
P(e
12
12
12
12
22
P(s
22
=
.9
=
.94
=
.96
=
.98
=
= 1.0
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Note that P(e„„) = 0, which means that the second control technique cannot
detect the presence of an error of the second type. As a result, PCs^^)=1.0
and P(c--) and PCct--) ^^^ undefined. Table 4 summarizes the computations
for the various formulae presented in this section.
Notice in this example that the process under control is only 50%
accurate with respect to errors of type 1. In a situation of this type,
even the second control contributes substantially to reliability - that is,
2 1
R, - R = .12166. However, in this particular example, the system is
slightly more economical with only the first control than it is with both
controls. With no controls, expected average total cost is greater than
twice as much as with one or both controls.
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R^"-^ P(s..) + R^-^Cl-PCs. -))P(d..) + (l-R^'^)PCe. .)P(c. .)
1
(.5)C.9) -H (.5)(.1)(.96) H- (.5jC.83(.9)
R
.858
.985561 = (.8)(.96) + (.8}(.04)(.98) + (.2) ( .95) (.98)
2
R^ = (.858)(.94) + (.858)(.06)(.98) + (. 142) (.9) ( .96) = .97966 (approx.)
2
R R2 = .98556 (since p(e22) = 0)
.2w„2R = (Rp(R2) = (.98556) (.97966) = .9655 (approx.)
P = CPi)(P2) = C.5)(.8) = .4
R-p = .9655 - .4 = .5655
Ct = E (1-p.) Ce.
i=l ^1' 1
= (.5) (20) + (.2) (10) = 12
I
Ct
^ ^ fi-l i-1
n j: R-! (l-Ps..)) + (1-R-! )P(e..)Z Cc. + Z (l-R.)Ce. + _ ,
_ , , _j=i J i=i 1 1 i=i j=i
j
1 iJ 1 ' ^ ir
= 1 + 2 + (.02034) (20) + (.01444) (10) + [(.5)(.l) + (.5) (.8)] 3
+ [(,858)(.06) + (.142)(.9)j 3 + [(.8)(.04) + (.2)(.95)]2
+ [(.98556) (0) + (.01444) (0)] 2
= 5.883 (approx.)
Cs,
If only the first control is used:
Ct = 1 + (.142)(20) + (.01444)(10) + [C.5)(.l) + (.5)(.8)]3 + [( . 8) ( .04) + (.2) (.95)]
= 5.7784
Table 4
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Extensicns of the Model
The set of models presented above represents the basic framework
the controller's decision situation with respect to an internal control
blera. A controller may use the model (i) to analyze the reliability
economic efficiency of an existing internal control system, and/or
to optimize the design of a new internal control system.
The auditor may use this same framework to develop internal control
oramendations for his clients. However, the auditor's primary decision
h respect to internal control involves evaluating the internal control
tem to assess the extent of audit testing necessary to formulate an
nion on the financial statements. This decision requires a somewhat
"ferent version of the model, a version which is developed in this sec-
in. Prior to the discussion of this problem, however, two other simple
ensions of the model are presented.
"ect of Controls on Process Probabi. ities
Thus far, an implicit assumption has been made that the presence or
;ence of a control procedure has no effect upon p., the probability of
ipleting the original process without committing an error of type i.
/ever, there are many realistic situations in which this assumption is
"•iously invalid. For example, the primary contribution of the control
:hnique of separation of functions is likely to be to reduce the proba-
.ity that embezzlement will ever happen, rather than to increase the
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probability of detecting and correcting it once it does. happen. The degree
of supervision used might have a similar effect. Even the use of a control
total might increase the care with vjhich a clerk posts remittances to an
accounts receivable ledger. In situations of this type, the presence of
the control tends to inhibit the commisoion of the error.
This factor may be quite easily incorporated into the basic model.
All that is required is the definition of a new parameter, p., which rep-
resents the probability that the ith error will not occur in the initial
process given that the set of r control techniques are used. Normally,
r r-1
p. < p. , which means that error i becomes increasingly less likely to
occur as more control techniques are used. To incorporate this parameter
i-1 "^into the model, note that R. = pt when i = 1.
Differences in the Timing of Controls
Another simplifying assumption made in the multiple control case is
that, in a series of control techniques directed at a particular type of
error, the timing of performance of ei, :h control is consistent across all
of the controls. There are mapy cases in v;hich this assumption also does
not square with reality. For example , both the use cf a batch control total
and the preparation of a brnk reconciliation are directed at errors in post-
ing the total of cash receipts to the general ledger. However, the batch
control total may be used once a day, while the bank reconciliation may be
prepared once a month. Where differences in timing of this sort exist,
the basic model cannot be used without irodification.
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Assume that the process under study is performed k times prior to
the application of the jth control technique. Then the system reliability
i-1 kprior to performance of the jth control step should be expressed (R. )1
instead of simply R-i " .J-1
Though the adjustment o2 reliability is relatively simple^ situations
of this type also comT>l3cate th? analysis of costs. Note that both Cs.,
the cost of search. ..d correction of an error, and Ce., the
1
cost of an undetected error, should vary directly with the number of errors
of type i. If the initial process which begets srroi i is performed sev-
eral times prior to the control step^ then several errors of type i might
be present when the control step is performed.
To explore briefly the effects of this situation upon the cost anal-
ysis, consider first the cost of search, detection and correction of an
error. This should now be expressed as Cs.., which represents the average
cost of search, detection and correction of an error or errors of type i
signalled by .;he ;"th control step. A fomuia for this variable is
Cs.. = (Cs.;(Ns..)
where Cs. v;ould repre.>ant the ccst of search, detection and correction for
one error of typo i, and Ns. . represents the average nur.ber of errors of
•'-J
type i signalled oy the jtli control step. Ns.. is a function of R.
and k, and may be easily derived.
In a similar vein, the cost of one or more errors of type i which go
undetected by a set of r control steps may be represented by Ce. , which

:ould then be expressed
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Ce. - (Cs.}CNe. )
where Ce. is the average cost of one undetected error of type i, and No..,
J-
"
lit
is the average number of errors of tj^e i which go undetected by a set of
r control steps. Ne. may alro be derived in terzns of tlie other parameters
of the model. Since this derivation is relatively complex and is not
essential to a basic understanding of the model, it is not presented here.
Use of the Model in Auditing
To the auditor an accurate lueasure of R would be useful to the evalu-
ation of an internal control system. However, of even greater value would
be an estimate of the expected dollar f^moun^ by whic'i each financirl state-
ment account balance vari33 from its "true" balance. Such an estimate may
be derived by means of an extension of the basic reliability model. Assume
that the estimated total effect of errors of type i on the dollar balance
of the account in question is represented by A.. Then
A. = (Ne. )CVe.)(T )1 ^ ir' 1-^ ^ r
Where Ne. is defined as per thj previous section, Ve. represents the
average dollar effect cf a single undetected error of type i on the balance
of the account, and T represents the number of cycles of performance of
the set of r control teciiniques over the relevant period of time. To
clarify the meaning of T
,
consider that a bank reconciliation is often
performed once a month nnd usually represents the last control step in a
cycle of controls relating to the cash account. For a per^'od of one year,
then, the value of T would be 12 with respect to the set of controls over
cash.
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Since several different errors may affect the balance of a particu-
lar account, the expected total variance of an account balance from its
true balance is expressed
A = 2 A.
1=1 ^
where the set of errors from i - 1 to iii encompasses all types of errors
which might affect the balance of the account.
It should be noted that A is an expected value, which means that
it represents the mean of a range of possible values. An estimate of the
standard deviation around this mean value would also pro\'e useful to the
auditor. To derive this, estimates of the standard deviations around
Ne. and Ve. are necessary for each of the m types of errors affecting
the account balance. These estimates may easily be developed from data
available to the auditor. Following this, the standard deviation around
A. may be derived for each of the m errors, which in turn makes it possible
to compute the standard deviation around A.
The auditor will wish to derive an estimate of reliability for each
related set of internal controls within an organization, as well as esti-
mates of the mean and standard deviation of the expected difference between
each financial statement account balance and its "true" balance. An analysi:
of this sort will provide an auditor with some objectively derived evidence
upon which to base his judgements regarding the extent of testing necessary
to the audit, thereby helping him satisfy the second standard of field work.
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Problems of Implementation
Any proposal of a new approach to an old problem is probably not
complete without a discussion of problems of implementation. In the case
of the models presented in this paper, problems o5 implementation will
certainly be significant, but should not be overv/helming.
The basic implementation problem with the models developed in this
paper is the derivation of estimates of the probability and cost parame-
ters. However, if a structured program of collection and analysis of
past error and cost data is developed, data upon which to base such esti-
mates should be readily available. Consider first the probability para-
meters upon which the calculation of system reliability is based. Estimates
J"
of all of these parameter values - p., P(e. .), P(s..)> PCc..) and P(d..)
- can be developed from (i) records of srror frequencies and error correc-
tion procedures maintained by clerical personnel who perform the control
procedures, and (2] data collected by internal or external auditors as a
normal part of the audit process. On< i a |,rocedure for compiling these
data is in use, the macter of implementing the basic reliability model
should be quite simple.
Consider next the cost parajneters. Of thsse, Cc . is a clerical cost,
J
and should therefore be directly proportional with the amount of time spent
on the jth control technique. Similarly, Cs. . should be directly propor-
tional to the average amount of time spent searching for, detecting and
correcting the ith error signalled by the jth control step. However, the
cost of each type of error, Ce., can at best only be estimated on a
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subjective basis. Does this mean that the analysis of system costs can be
no moi-e accurate than a subjective estimate? The answer is no. because,
as explained below, the analysis of costs can be perfoT-med without having
to estimate specific values for the various Ce. .
To illustrate the truth of this statement, consider a case where a
controller is trying to decide whether or not to use a particular control
technique. Given estimates of the five basic probability parameters, and
of Cc. and Cs. . , for all relevant values of i and j, it is possible to
solve for a break-even value of Ce. . This would be the value of Ce. at
1 1
which total expected system costs with the control technique ere exactly
equal to total expected system costs without the control technique. Given
this break-even value, the controllei then must decide only whether he
feels that the actual cost of the error is greater than the break-even
cost (in which case the control technique should be used) , or less than
the break-even cost (in which case the control technique should not be
used) . Therefore, any choice among alternative control systems may be
made on a basis which o.oes not require the making of subjective estimates
of error costs.
Implementation of this model b) the external auditor requires, in
addition to estimates of Ihe five basic probability pax-ameters for all
i and j, a measure of Ve. for each type of er."- -.nd of the standard
deviation around Ve. , Since Ve. represents the average dollar effect
of an error of type i on the financial statement account balance, these
estimates should be easily prepared from data readily available to the
auditor.
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It can only be concluded that implementation of the approach outlined
in this paper does not present any insurmountable obstacles. Indeed, the
primary problem with the models is not likely to be one of deriving the
estimates or performing the calculftions, but of interpreting the results.
The numbers generated by the models may project a sense of certitude v;hich
is inconsistent with the fact that all of the model calculations are based
upon estimates. It must be recognized by controllers and auditors that
the models are intended only to supplement their judgement, not to replace it
Conclusions
The internal control models presented in this paper provide a frame-
work for the analysis and design of internal control systems by controllers
and auditors. The models themselves identify the parameters which are
relevant to such analysis anci design. It therefore seems appropriate that
future research on this subject be directed at the problems of developing
estimates of these parameters and usino the models in a real situation.
This suggests that the performance of & field study should perhaps be the
next step in futura research.
At least one aspect of the models presented herein suggests a possible
pragmatic application of behavioral research methodology. Recall the dis-
cussion of the potential capacity of a control procedure to inhibit the
initial occurrence of an error. Behavioral research could perhaps identify
under what conditions and to what extent this is likely to occur.
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A third potential avenue of future research would involve extending
the models themselves to incorporate the concept of utility. Since a
decision not to use a particular control is inherently more risky than
its counterpart, a conservative person might reasonably decide to adopt
a control which is not economical. Conversely, a less conservative per-
son might decide not to use a control that is economical . Perhaps this
explains v/hy some clients fail to adopt control recommendations provided
by their auditors.





